Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 72
Issue 6 Issue 6

Article 5

11-2019

The Other Janus and the Future of Labor’s Capital
David H. Webber

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David H. Webber, The Other Janus and the Future of Labor’s Capital, 72 Vanderbilt Law Review 2087
(2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol72/iss6/5

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Webber_PAGE

11/16/2019 7:09 PM

The Other Janus and the Future of
Labor’s Capital
David H. Webber*
Two forms of labor’s capital—union funds and public pension funds—
have profoundly reshaped the corporate world. They have successfully
advocated for shareholder empowerment initiatives like proxy access,
declassified boards, majority voting, say on pay, private fund registration, and
the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. They have also served as lead plaintiffs in forty
percent of federal securities fraud and Delaware deal class actions. Today,
much-discussed reforms like revised shareholder proposal rules and mandatory
arbitration threaten two of the main channels by which these shareholders have
exercised power. But labor’s capital faces its greatest, even existential, threats
from outside corporate law. This Essay addresses one of those threats: the direct
and indirect challenges posed to labor’s capital by the Supreme Court’s holding
in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Council 31. These threats may have spillover effects in the corporate arena. This
Essay discusses these developments in light of Randall Thomas’s early and
prescient work on labor as a shareholder.
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INTRODUCTION
When corporate lawyers and scholars discuss “the Janus case,”
they usually mean Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, a
2011 U.S. Supreme Court opinion that limited who could be sued for
making false statements in violation of Rule 10b-5.1 But another Janus,
a labor case, may have greater implications for the corporate world than
its more familiar namesake.2 In the 2017 decision Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, the
Court overturned more than forty years of precedent to strike down
“fair share fees” on First Amendment grounds.3 “Fair share fees,” or
“agency fees,” were required fees public employees paid to public-sector
unions to compensate the unions for the benefits they secured for
workers via collective bargaining.4 Long-standing precedent held that
workers could not be forced to join public-sector unions, or to support
union political activities, but they could be required to pay “fair share
fees.”5 Under collective bargaining rules, unions were required to
represent all workers in a unionized workplace, even those who chose
not to join them.6 In the absence of fair share fees, the requirement that
unions represent all workers could have led to worker free riding, one
of the express rationales for upholding such fees under long-standing
Supreme Court precedent in 1977’s Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education.7
Forty years later, Mark Janus brought suit to directly challenge
Abood after Justice Alito invited such a challenge in Harris v. Quinn,

1.
564 U.S. 135, 141 (2011); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019) (“It shall be unlawful for any
person . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.”).
2.
See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)
(holding that “fair share fees” violate the free speech rights of nonunion members).
3.
Id. at 2460, 2486 (overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
4.
Id. at 2461–66; id. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that “agency fees [are] now
often called fair-share fees”).
5.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 (approving nonunion members’ argument that “they may
constitutionally prevent the Union’s spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to
political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining
representative”).
6.
Right to Fair Representation, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/whats-law/employees/i-am-represented-union/right-fair-representation (last visited Nov.
8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7TWM-FLGC] (“Your union has the duty to represent all employees –
whether members of the union or not – fairly, in good faith, and without discrimination.”).
7.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 221–24.
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asking whether it was time to revisit that holding.8 Janus was a childsupport specialist who worked for the Illinois Department of Healthcare
and Family Services.9 He was not a member of the local American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”)
union that represented him and workers like him in negotiating wages,
benefits, and workplace conditions with the State of Illinois.10 He
objected to the forty-five-dollar-per-month “fair share fee” he was
required to pay to the AFSCME local to compensate it for negotiating
on his behalf, arguing that the fee violated his First Amendment
rights.11 Janus characterized union negotiations with the government
over salaries, pensions and benefits as speech.12 The Supreme Court
agreed.13 Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Alito stated: “In simple
terms, the First Amendment does not permit the government to compel
a person to pay for another party’s speech just because the government
thinks that the speech furthers the interests of the person who does not
want to pay.”14 Mark Janus’s negative-value legal claim was financed
by the Liberty Justice Center (part of the conservative think tank
Illinois Policy Institute) and funded by organizations like Donors Trust,
the Charles Koch Institute, and the Ed Uihlein Family Foundation.15
The Janus holding has both direct and indirect implications for
labor as a shareholder. The direct implication is that the reasoning in
Janus might apply directly to public pension funds themselves. Just as
public-sector workers were once required to pay fair share fees, so they
are required to contribute to public pension plans.16 Could the reasoning
in Janus apply to these plans? In an era in which environmental, social,
and governance investing has risen to prominence, at what point do a
public pension’s investment choices implicate the First Amendment,
8.
See 573 U.S. 616, 635 (2014) (“The Abood Court’s analysis is questionable on several
grounds. Some of these were noted or apparent at or before the time of the decision, but several
have become more evident and troubling in the years since then.”).
9.
Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Strikes down Public-Sector Union Fees,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2018, 12:14 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysiscourt-strikes-down-public-sector-union-fees/ [https://perma.cc/6VUV-U5XE].
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2461–62
(2018).
13. Id. at 2486.
14. Id. at 2467.
15. Celine McNicholas, Zane Mokhiber & Marni von Wilpert, Janus and Fair Share Fees: The
Organizations Financing the Attack on Unions’ Ability to Represent Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1,
9 (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/142063.pdf [perma.cc/8QJ9-UMMC].
16. NASRA Issue Brief: Employee Contributions to Public Pension Plans, NAT’L ASS’N ST.
RETIREMENT
ADMINS.
1
(Sept.
2019),
https://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/
NASRAContribBrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEW7-FBAY] (discussing the mandatory nature of
public pension fund payments).
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thereby mandating opt-out rights to dissenters?17 And if so, will Janus
hasten the demise of the traditional defined-benefit pension in favor of
the 401(k), following the path taken in the private sector decades ago?18
Even if the Janus holding does not directly apply to the
financing and structure of public pension funds—and there are good
reasons to believe it does not—the case is likely to have indirect effects
on labor’s shareholder activism.19 To the extent that the Janus holding
reduces funding for public-sector unions, those unions will have fewer
resources to deploy for shareholder activism and to defend public
pensions from the unrelenting legal and political attacks they face from
the same forces that financed Janus.20
Finally, I will discuss these new threats to labor’s capital in light
of Randall Thomas’s early and prescient work on the subject more than
twenty years ago. Thomas coauthored, with Stewart Schwab, the first
empirical work on labor’s shareholder activism, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, published in the
Michigan Law Review in February 1998.21 That piece noted the tension
such funds might face in navigating their interests as both workers and
shareholders.22 And it made several predictions, including that “the
alignment of union and other shareholders will have profound effects
on both corporate governance and long-term union goals”23 and “[i]f
unions can package the results of their research in proposals that
emphasize to shareholders the ways in which the two groups’ interests
are aligned, then union-shareholder activism could be here to stay.”24

17. See Keyur Patel, ESG Investing Moves to the Mainstream, 74 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 39, 39
(2018) (“The number of companies worldwide that report environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) data has grown exponentially over recent years, from fewer than 20 in the early 1990s to
almost 9,000 in 2016.”).
18. See Alicia H. Munnell & Anqi Chen, 401(k)/IRA Holdings in 2016: An Update from the
SCF,
CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. B.C.
2
(Oct.
2017),
https://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/IB_17-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R29-NCUN].
19. See, e.g., Da Lin, Janus and Public Pension Funds, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/janus-and-public-pension-funds/ [https://perma.cc/J6DR-AJ3E]
(discussing the differences between public pension funds and agency fees and questioning whether
the Janus majority would apply its reasoning to public pension funds).
20. See McNicholas, Mokhiber & von Wilpert, supra note 15, at 8–12 (examining the
organizations funding fair share fee litigation and noting that without these fees unions will be
forced to operate with fewer resources).
21. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998) (investigating the
consequences of new shareholder activism by unions).
22. Id. at 1020.
23. Id. at 1023.
24. Id. at 1025.

Webber_PAGE

2019]

11/16/2019 7:09 PM

THE FUTURE OF LABOR’S CAPITAL

2091

These predictions hold up after twenty-one years.25 Hopefully, this
discussion of Janus will help inform our view of whether they will
continue to hold in the coming decades.
I. THE POTENTIAL DIRECT EFFECTS OF JANUS ON LABOR’S CAPITAL
The first threat posed by Janus to labor’s capital is a direct one:
the argument that struck down fair share fees as violating the First
Amendment could potentially be applied to public pension funds, which
also receive mandatory contributions from public-sector workers.26 To
what extent might public pension fund shareholder activism constitute
coercive speech, and where might courts draw the line? In a separate
writing project, I will offer a comprehensive analysis of the First
Amendment implications of mandatory pension contributions by state
and local government employees. Here, I will highlight some of the main
arguments on both sides.
A. The Debate Over Whether Pension Contributions Are Coercive
Even before Janus was decided, some commentators argued that
workers should be able to opt out of mandatory pension contributions
on First Amendment grounds.27 In Shareholder Activism by Public
Pension Funds and the Rights of Dissenting Employees Under the First
Amendment, Eric Finseth characterized environmental, social, and
governance (“ESG”) investing as political or ideological rather than
commercial speech.28 By engaging in ESG investing, Finseth argued,
pensions depart from the economic goals that are supposed to be
paramount, triggering heightened First Amendment concerns.29 As
such, public pensions must create opt-out rights for contributing
workers.30 There are multiple responses to Finseth’s argument. First,
ESG investing is not a departure from, but an enhancement of,

25. See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST
WEAPON (2018) (discussing the effects of labor’s shareholder activism over the years and detailing
the legal and political challenges this activism faces).
26. NASRA Issue Brief: Employee Contributions to Public Pension Plans, supra note 16, at 1
(discussing the mandatory nature of public pension fund payments).
27. See, e.g., Eric John Finseth, Shareholder Activism by Public Pension Funds and the Rights
of Dissenting Employees Under the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 293 (2011)
(arguing that dissenting employees have a First Amendment right to object to their portion of
shares being used to advance political or ideological goals).
28. Id. at 349–62.
29. Id. at 366.
30. Id. at 294.
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economic criteria.31 ESG advocates have argued that taking such
factors into account represents an investment decision because, for
example, global warming poses investment risks for a broad range of
companies, including, most prominently, energy and insurance
companies.32 There is some (contested) empirical evidence that ESG
investing has outperformed traditional investment portfolios.33 Second,
pension fund fiduciary duties bar trustees from investing for purely
political reasons.34 Still, it is true that pensions have, on occasion, taken
explicitly political criteria into account in making investments.35 The
classic example was divestment from South African companies over
Apartheid, in which many states adopted legislation changing their
plans to require divestment.36 Widespread revulsion against Apartheid,
31. See, e.g., Investment Governance and the Integration of Environmental, Social and
Governance
Factors,
ORG.
FOR
ECON.
COOPERATION
&
DEV.
30
(2017),
https://www.oecd.org/finance/Investment-Governance-Integration-ESG-Factors.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F676-HYF5] (“[I]t is increasingly argued that integrating ESG factors –
especially climate change factors – can help institutional investors avoid significant shocks to their
portfolios related to physical and transition risks.”).
32. Id.; see, e.g., Meaghan Kilroy, Environmental, Social Issues Big in Proxy Season,
PENSIONS
&
INV.
(July
9,
2018,
1:00
AM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/
20180709/PRINT/180709889/environmental-social-issues-big-in-proxy-season [https://perma.cc/
DC4L-GA8D] (noting that environmental and social concerns accounted for over half of
shareholder proposals submitted at U.S. companies in 2018); Mike Scott, Insurers Will Be HardHit by Climate Change but They’re Not Investing in the Low-Carbon Economy, FORBES (May 31,
2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikescott/2018/05/31/insurers-in-the-front-line-ofthe-fight-against-climate-change-shoot-themselves-in-the-foot/#4cb1b6db40fa [https://perma.cc/
4WSS-KAHQ] (discussing the significant losses facing insurers as climate change hurts the
companies they invest in).
33. See Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch & Alexander Bassen, ESG and Financial Performance:
Aggregated Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210,
212 (2015) (“[W]e find that the business case for ESG investing is empirically well founded.”).
Contra Frank J. Fabozzi, K.C. Ma & Becky J. Oliphant, Sin Stock Returns, 35 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT.
82, 84 (2008) (“The financial performance that underlies social responsibility has generated an
obvious interest on the part of investors, but the empirical evidence that supports investment
performance is far from conclusive.”); Christophe Revelli & Jean-Laurent Viviani, Financial
Performance of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI): What Have We Learned? A Meta-Analysis, 24
BUS. ETHICS 158, 158 (2015) (“[G]lobally, there is no real cost or benefit to investing in SRI.”).
34. JOHN J. CANARY, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. NO. 2018-01,
INTERPRETIVE
BULLETINS
2016-01
AND
2015-01
(Apr.
23,
2018)
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistancebulletins/2018-01 [https://perma.cc/E6CE-WDYM] (“The Department has a . . . longstanding
position that . . . fiduciaries may not sacrifice investment returns or assume greater investment
risks as a means of promoting collateral social policy goals.”).
35. See Richard M. Ennis & Roberta L. Parkhill, South African Divestment: Social
Responsibility or Fiduciary Folly?, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30, 30–33 (1986) (discussing investment
and divestment strategies directed at influencing the political situation in South Africa).
36. See Sandy Boyer, Divesting from Apartheid: A Summary of State and Municipal
Legislative Action on South Africa, AM. COMMITTEE ON AFR. (Mar. 1983),
http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-CB5-84-al.sff.document.acoa000587.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KH8-DNC3] (cataloging state and local legislation on divesting from South
African companies and apartheid).
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legislation protecting pension fiduciaries from claims for breach of
fiduciary duty over Apartheid divestment, and the lack of legal
challenges to fiduciaries over such divestment created precedents of
uncertain value when it comes to adopting explicitly political criteria.37
Even widespread scientific consensus over global warming has not
translated into U.S. pension fiduciaries directly divesting from carbonproducing companies on political grounds alone.38 Such choices are still
largely rooted in debates about the business risk of investing in
unsustainable businesses.39 (In contrast, some European funds have
divested on political grounds alone, such as when Norway’s
Government Pension Fund divested from oil and gas.40 However, even
these divestments can be considered business focused because Norway
is massively exposed to the oil and gas business as an oil-producing
country.41 The Pension Fund is itself funded by the Norwegian
government from oil revenues including taxes and licenses for oil
exploration, and is therefore already significantly exposed to the oil and
gas business.42) To the extent that investing or divesting on
environmental grounds may be characterized as a political and not an
investment choice—as Finseth seems to describe it—must states
provide an opt-out right for individual employees in such
circumstances, given the coercive nature of pension contributions?
Yet another First Amendment concern was raised by Jennifer
Mueller.43 Mueller argued in a Slate article, How the Janus Ruling
Might Doom Public Pensions Next, that if a public employee “cannot be
required to ‘subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public

37. See Ennis & Parkhill, supra note 35, at 35–36.
38. See Umair Irfran, The World’s Richest Institutions Invest in Fossil Fuels. Activists are
Changing That., VOX (May 15, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/5/13/18282438/fossil-fueldivestment-climate-finance [https://perma.cc/LR5V-Z24N].
39. See, e.g., Stanley Reed, Norway Moves to Sell Some Oil and Gas Shares From Wealth
Fund, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/business/norway-fund-oilgas.html [https://perma.cc/6RHG-BY92] (discussing the Norwegian wealth fund’s sale of oil and
natural gas holdings).
40. Id.
41. Id. (“The Norwegian finance minister, Siv Jensen, said on Friday that the government
aimed to ‘reduce the vulnerability of our common wealth to a permanent oil price decline.’ ”).
42. See id. (“The fund . . . was created with revenue from the country’s oil and gas operations
and is invested in securities and real estate outside Norway with the intention of providing for an
aging population and for when oil revenues begin to decline.”); see also Government Pension Fund
Act, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT. (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.nbim.no/en/organisation/governancemodel/government-pension-fund-act/ [https://perma.cc/NJ2Z-7QH8] (establishing that the Pension
Fund is funded in part by “the net cash flow from petroleum activities,” which includes revenue
from certain taxes, dividends, and royalities).
43. Jennifer Mueller, How the Janus Ruling Might Doom Public Pensions Next, SLATE (July
18, 2018, 4:17 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/how-the-janus-ruling-might-doompublic-pensions-next.html [https://perma.cc/X9W9-YHGK].
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concern,’ as Justice Alito wrote in Janus, why does this protection stop
with his union fee? Why does it not also extend to his pension?”44 She
amplified these arguments in a law review article, The Paycheck
Problem.45 To the extent that corporations themselves engage in
political activity, workers are arguably forced to subsidize such activity
through their mandatory contributions to pension funds that, in turn,
invest in said corporations.46 These companies regularly lobby the
government on matters of public concern.47 For example,
pharmaceutical companies lobby the government over Medicaid
reimbursement levels.48 Can this kind of lobbying be analogized to
lobbying the government over public employee wages and benefits,
which the Janus majority characterized as speech? This concern raised
by Mueller goes even further than the argument made by Finseth,
which applied only to ESG investing.49 It could potentially sweep almost
all investment into the realm of the First Amendment.
In contrast, Da Lin has argued that public pension investing
differs in a fundamental respect from collective bargaining by labor
unions, and therefore Janus might not apply.50 She pointed out that the
Janus majority “stressed that fees supporting ‘collective bargaining in
the private sector’ do not raise the same free speech problems as fees
supporting ‘collective bargaining with a government employer.’ ”51 Lin
notes that “[t]his is because ‘[i]n the public sector, core issues such as
wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues, but that is
generally not so in the private sector.’ ”52 Janus only struck down
public-sector agency fees and, in so doing, placed significant weight on
the public-private sector distinction.53 That seems to suggest that the
court would leave private-sector union agency fees alone. In one postJanus case, a federal district court declined to apply the holding to a
44. Id.
45. Jennifer Mueller, The Paycheck Problem, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561 (2018) (examining
the tensions in the Supreme Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence and suggesting a new
limiting principle to advance the operational purpose of the First Amendment).
46. Id. at 566.
47. Id. at 567, 605.
48. Id. at 604.
49. Finseth, supra note 27, at 293.
50. See Lin, supra note 19 (distinguishing public pensions from unions on the basis that
public pensions invest in private-sector companies, rather than in government entities).
51. Id. (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2480 (2018)).
52. Id. (quoting Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2480).
53. See 138 S. Ct. at 2480 (criticizing Abood for failing to “take into account the difference
between the effects of agency fees in public- and private-sector collective bargaining”); id. at 2486
(concluding that “[s]tates and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from
nonconsenting employees.”).
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private-sector union.54 Lin further characterized public pension
“speech” as focusing on the internal governance of investees or the fees
charged by investment managers, “private matters that affect neither
government budgets nor important public policies.”55 By an extension
of this reasoning, Mueller’s argument is at best an indirect one.56 Public
pension investment in companies and shareholder activism at such
companies are interventions in the private sphere.
Thus, one question at the heart of the doctrinal dispute between
Finseth, Mueller, and Lin is whether public pension investment activity
constitutes forced speech of the sort that would run afoul of the Court’s
holding in Janus.57 Rather than parse out that argument here, I will
instead assume for the sake of argument that public pension fund
investment does indeed implicate the First Amendment concerns raised
in Janus. What effects would that have on public pensions and their
investment behaviors? Briefly, it could require the funds to create optout rights, thereby putting even more pressure on funds to convert to a
401(k) model.58 It could also lead to reductions in ESG activity, if any
such ruling were to strongly suggest that such considerations deviated
from value-maximizing activity. But it could additionally lead to minor
structural changes that would have negligible effect. The devil is in the
details, but some options are sketched out below.
B. Structural Direct Effects
One potential workaround for the speech problem would be a
system of direct employer payments, as Da Lin and Ben Sachs have

54. See Carter v. Transp. Workers Union of Am. Local 556, 353 F. Supp. 3d 556, 576 (N.D.
Tex. 2019) (“[T]he ruling in Janus applies to public-sector unions and workers, not private-sector
unions and workers. . . . It remains to be seen if the Supreme Court’s ruling in Janus will be
extended to private-sector unions; however, this is not the issue before the Court in the instant
case.”).
55. Lin, supra note 19.
56. See Mueller, supra note 45, at 566–67, 605 (arguing that at a fundamental level, private
pensions are not dissimilar to public ones).
57. See Finseth, supra note 27, at 293 (arguing that “dissenting public sector employees have
a right to opt out of having their pro rata portion of shares of publicly traded corporations held by
public pension funds voted with respect to political or ideological matters in a manner with which
the dissenting employees disagree”); Lin, supra note 19 (arguing that although “mandatory
employee pension contributions are [likely] unconstitutional under Janus’s framework,” other
viable funding options exist); Mueller, supra note 45, at 567 (arguing that it is difficult “to identify
constitutionally meaningful grounds to distinguish pension contributions from agency fees for the
purposes of a compelled speech analysis”).
58. See, e.g., Finseth, supra note 27, at 294, 366 (arguing that employees have these rights
under the First Amendment).
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argued.59 Rather than force workers to pay into the pension system via
a paycheck deduction, employers could make a direct payment on behalf
of workers to the pension. If the pension dollars are directly contributed
by the employer on the worker’s behalf, rather than by the worker
herself, the First Amendment implications may be eliminated.60 Thus,
states and cities interested in largely preserving the current defined
benefit could move to collectively managed pension funds, and these
could largely continue operating as usual.
A second option would be the creation of opt-out rights. Public
employees could opt out of the pension if they so desire.61 The question
is, what would they opt into? One possible answer is the 401(k). As I
have argued in my book, The Rise of the Working Class Shareholder:
Labor’s Last Best Weapon, the greatest threat to labor’s capital and
labor’s shareholder activism is the 401(k).62 There is a concerted effort
by many of the same entities that financed Janus to undermine public
pension funds by “smashing and scattering” them into millions of
individually managed 401(k)s that are then farmed out to mutual
funds.63 The success of that campaign will likely doom labor’s
shareholder activism, bringing to an end a significant chapter in the
history of corporate governance.64 That is because the necessary
precondition for labor to exercise shareholder power is for it to have
separately managed pools of assets like those that currently exist in
public pension funds.65 Mutual funds have shown an increasing
willingness to be active, but they will never fill the void of public
pensions, for structural business reasons that I have discussed in depth
elsewhere.66 Elimination of pensions and widespread conversion to the
401(k) is not unthinkable—it is exactly what has happened in the
private sector, and a well-funded campaign to bring about the same
conversion in the public sector is already underway, as detailed in The

59. See Lin, supra note 19 (discussing the use of direct employer payments in the public
pension fund context); Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1046, 1073–74 (2018) (discussing the use of direct employer payments in the union context).
60. Lin, supra note 19.
61. See Finseth, supra note 27, at 294, 366 (arguing that employees have these rights under
the First Amendment).
62. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 213–21.
63. David Webber, The Real Reason the Investor Class Hates Pensions, N.Y. TIMES (March 5,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/opinion/investor-class-pensions.html
[https://
perma.cc/F9XR-7G8Z].
64. See WEBBER, supra note 25, at 213, 218–20 (discussing the practical difficulties of
sustaining meaningful shareholder activism with a 401(k) plan, as opposed to a centralized,
defined-benefit plan).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 220.
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Rise of the Working Class Shareholder.67 The result in Janus will only
aid that campaign.68
Still, to the extent workers could retain the option to remain in
traditional public pension funds, there are good reasons to believe that
the majority of them would do so. First, as Lin, Sachs, and others have
argued, there is no free-rider problem in the public pension context
because workers do not get pension benefits if they fail to pay into the
system.69 This contrasts with nonunionized workers who may still
benefit from wages, benefits, and working conditions negotiated by
public-sector unions. The absence of a free-rider problem reduces the
incentive to drop participation, since costs are not unfairly imposed on
some workers to the benefit of all.70 Thus, the main reason to opt out of
a public pension would be if the pension’s ESG investing so offended a
worker that she preferred to opt out. Here, the cultural messaging
around public pension funds might play a role in that worker’s opt-out
decision.
For decades, critics of public-sector unions have argued that they
are bad for workers.71 According to that argument, these unions collect
fees from workers that benefit the unions themselves and their
leadership at the expense of the rank and file.72 The movement to
deprive public-sector workers of the right to unionize has long been
called “right to work,” conveying the message that unions inhibit
worker freedom and workers’ ability to earn a living.73 Thus, once
legally liberated from the requirement of paying union dues, workers
could keep more of their paychecks and rid themselves of useless, “jobkilling” unions.74 As discussed below, that has not happened yet, but
antiunion organizations remain confident that it will.
In contrast, critics of public pensions have made almost the
opposite argument. In such messaging, the victim of public pension

67. Id.
68. Id. at 238–40.
69. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 19 (contrasting public pensions with labor unions, with respect
to the free-rider problem).
70. See id. (discussing why “a voluntary payment mechanism is more viable in the pension
setting” than in the union setting).
71. See, e.g., David Harsanyi, Public-Sector Unions Deserve to Be Destroyed, REASON (Mar. 2,
2018,
12:30
AM),
https://reason.com/2018/03/02/public-sector-unions-deserve-to-be-destr
[https://perma.cc/74ZT-R9F8] (highlighting the coercive nature of public-sector unions).
72. See id. (comparing the mechanics of public-sector unions to racketeering).
73. See Right to Work Frequently-Asked Questions, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF.
FOUND., https://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2019) [https://perma.cc/HEL6-R5MZ].
74. See Harsanyi, supra note 71 (challenging the notion that unions are helpful for workers—
for example, through alleged benefits of collective bargaining negotiations).
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funds is not workers but taxpayers.75 According to this view, public
employee pensions are so exorbitant, so rich and unaffordable, that they
must be pared back or they will harm taxpayers.76 For example,
Americans for Prosperity, financed by the Koch brothers, ran a
“Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous on A Government Pension”
campaign in California, in which it hired a chauffeur to drive a white
stretch limousine around the state to draw attention to what retirement
was supposedly like for California state employees.77 Whatever effect
that message had on taxpayers, it would seem unlikely to discourage
workers from participating in such pensions. If anything, it might have
increased their gratitude for them.
Thus, in deciding whether to drop union membership, a worker
might have strong cultural and economic reasons for doing so. But in
dropping participation in a public pension fund, there is little or no
economic reason to do so, and in fact, that worker may well think of that
decision as one requiring her to give up a large benefit in exchange for
greater ideological purity. She might still make that choice. Public
pensions might be smaller without such dissenting participants, and
that would correspondingly decrease their shareholder power, but it
would not unfairly impose costs on some workers for the benefit of
others, thereby incentivizing all workers to drop out.
II. THE POTENTIAL INDIRECT EFFECTS OF JANUS ON LABOR’S CAPITAL
Even if Janus does not apply directly to public pensions, the
indirect effects may be large. To the extent Janus harms public-sector
unions, public pensions may be harmed too. It could reduce the funds
available for activism or reduce the funds available to defend public
pensions from attacks on their very existence.
Janus was financed by the Liberty Justice Center and the
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.78 Their express

75. See Monique Morrissey, Understanding Cuts to Public Pensions, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1, 1
(June
9,
2014),
https://www.epi.org/files/2014/understanding-cuts-to-public-pensions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9Q8-B279] (noting “fears that underfunded public pensions are a growing
burden on taxpayers”).
76. See id.
77. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 221; Americans for Prosperity California (@AFPCalifornia),
Pension
Reform
Tour,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/pg/AFPCalifornia/
photos/?tab=album&album_id=10150128290552318
(last
updated
Oct.
13,
2013)
[https://perma.cc/JA99-MKNY].
78. See McNicholas, Mokhiber & von Wilpert, supra note 15, at 7–9 (using IRS Form 990
filings to determine that both nonprofits represented the plaintiffs in Janus); Spencer Sunshine,
Meet the Money Backing Mark Janus and His Case v. AFSCME, UNIONIST (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://unionist.com/blogs/news/meet-the-money-backing-mark-janus-and-his-case-v-afscme
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purpose in bringing the lawsuit was to undermine public-sector
unions.79 The theory was that if Janus struck down fair share fees,
funding for public-sector unions would collapse, an argument the
unions themselves seemed to embrace.80 In anticipation of the Janus
ruling, major unions cut their budgets significantly.81 The capital
strategies groups of major unions were not spared these across-theboard cuts. For example, the Service Employees International Union
(“SEIU”) merged its Capital Stewardship Program and its Research and
Policy Programs into a new Strategic Initiatives Department designed
to fulfill both functions.82 Long considered the gold standard for labor’s
shareholder activism, the SEIU’s Capital Stewardship Program was a
prime mover, for example, in the California Public Employees
Retirement System’s decision to divest from hedge funds, a four-billiondollar divestment that sent a shockwave through the industry.83 True,
not all unions cut back as the SEIU did, but the anticipated net effect
of Janus cut union resources in ways that at least indirectly impacted
the corporate sphere. Unions reoriented scarce resources towards
remarketing themselves to their own members to keep them from
dropping the union or ceasing to pay their fair share fees in anticipation
of an adverse ruling in Janus.84
[https://perma.cc/V7LH-WZQ5] (stating that Mark Janus was represented by counsel from both
nonprofits).
79. See McNicholas, Mokhiber & von Wilpert, supra note 15, at 9 (describing how the Janus
plaintiffs argued “that public-sector unions should not be able to cover the cost of representing and
negotiating on behalf of nonmembers who benefit from the union’s representation”).
80. See id. at 2 (“Because unions are legally required to represent all employees in a
bargaining unit, not just union members, fair share fees are crucial . . . . [E]liminating fair share
fees defunds unions and goes a long way toward stripping workers of their ability to organize and
bargain collectively.”).
81. See Noam Scheiber, Supreme Court Labor Decision Wasn’t Just a Loss for Unions, N.Y.
TIMES (July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/business/economy/unions-fundingpolitical.html [https://perma.cc/4S9L-FWQE] (“Mary Kay Henry, the president of the Service
Employees International Union, said that her union had cut its budget by about 30 percent in
anticipation of the decision . . . .”); Mike Antonucci, Exclusive: Ahead of a Key Supreme Court
Decision, America’s Largest Teachers Union Slashes Budget by $50 Million, Projects That 300,000
Members May Leave, 74 MILLION (May 21, 2018), https://www.the74million.org/article/exclusivelargest-union-to-slash-budget-by-50-million-in-advance-of-supreme-court-decision-300000members-will-leave-within-2-years-leaders-predict/ [https://perma.cc/GR5J-M7TE]) (reporting
that the National Education Association planned to cut its budget by fifty million dollars, an
estimated thirteen percent reduction).
82. The Author received this information in an off-the-record email from an individual with
knowledge of the restructuring.
83. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 101–03; Mary Williams Walsh & Alexandra Stevenson, With
Pension Fund Giant Calpers Quitting Hedge Funds, Other Investors Reflect, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:31 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/with-calpersquitting-hedge-funds-other-investors-reflect/ [https://perma.cc/SBS2-H3FG].
84. See Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, How Unions Are Already Gearing Up for a
Supreme
Court
Loss,
GOVERNING
(Oct.
5,
2017,
3:00
AM),
https://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-janus-afscme-right-to-work-states-unions.html
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From the perspective of the unions, the short-term reaction to
Janus has been a best-case scenario. So far, there has been almost no
drop in union membership nationwide, and there is some evidence that
union membership has actually grown slightly.85 For example,
Pennsylvania, Oregon, California, and Chicago have all reported slight
increases in union membership since Janus.86 Some have attributed
that relative success to the unions’ remarketing campaigns.87 Others
point to public-sector unions’ still-formidable ability to flex their
political muscles in certain states, some of which have adopted
legislation designed to dampen the negative effects of Janus.88 For
example, New Jersey adopted legislation that narrowed the time frame
within which workers must decide to leave their unions,89 and New
York adopted legislation to ban disclosure of public employee contact
information that could enable antiunion groups to contact public
employees and encourage them to stop paying their fees.90 California,
Washington, and New Jersey “now prohibit public employers from
discouraging union membership.”91 Still others attribute this shortterm, post-Janus success to high-profile teacher strikes and the
increasing popularity of unions in a time of growing concern about
economic inequality and unequal bargaining power.92

[https://perma.cc/N3KA-5PNZ] (noting unions’ efforts to convince employees of the benefits of
union membership, and to reiterate the problems with employees who do not pay dues yet receive
benefits from the union).
85. See Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, Defying Predictions, Union Membership Isn’t
Dropping
Post-Janus,
GOVERNING
(Dec.
10,
2018,
3:00
AM),
http://www.governing.com/topics/workforce/gov-janus-impact-union-membership.html
[https://perma.cc/L8KN-85BY] (noting that, post-Janus, “most [union members] are staying put”
and membership has increased for certain unions, such as AFSCME).
86. Id.
87. See id. (describing the membership drives unions ran in anticipation of the Janus ruling,
which unions predicted would be unfavorable).
88. See id. (noting how “some Democratically controlled states have recently made it harder
for public employees to leave unions”).
89. Barrett & Greene, supra note 85; Pauline M.K. Young, Union Members May Opt-Out of
Paying Dues, N.J. LAW. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.newjerseylawyersblog.com/unionmembers-may-opt-out-of-paying-dues/ [https://perma.cc/RH4K-2X8J] (discussing New Jersey’s
Workplace Democracy Act).
90. Barrett & Greene, supra note 85; Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, How Much
Privacy Do Public Employees Actually Have?, GOVERNING (Sept. 24, 2018, 3:00 AM),
https://www.governing.com/topics/workforce/gov-government-public-employee-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZAE-2QFK] (discussing an executive order signed by Governor Cuomo).
91. Barrett & Greene, supra note 85.
92. See Bradley D. Marianno, Analysis: From the High Court to the Picket Line—How the
Janus Case Emboldened Teachers Unions & Made Strikes Key to Their Survival, 74 MILLION (Jan.
16, 2019), https://www.the74million.org/article/analysis-from-the-high-court-to-the-picket-linehow-the-janus-case-emboldened-teachers-unions-made-strikes-key-to-their-survival/
[https://perma.cc/E6U9-BWMY]; Lydia Saad, Labor Union Approval Steady at 15-Year High,
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But others view these short-term victories as the last gasp of
public-sector unions. Conservative groups are rallying to launch a
campaign to convince workers to stop paying their fair share fees and
drop their union memberships.93 They predict that union membership
and fair share fees will fall once employees become informed about their
right to leave,94 with most of the decline coming from future employees
never signing up in the first place.95
As noted above, such declines could lead to reduced assets
available for unions to engage in shareholder activism and reduced
capital strategies staffs, as has occurred at SEIU and AFSCME.
Declining membership and fee payment also have implications for the
drive to 401(k)s noted earlier. As I document in The Rise of the Working
Class Shareholder, there is a coordinated campaign to convert these
public pension funds into 401(k)s that are managed by mutual funds.96
The Koch brothers, the Arnold Foundation, and others have utilized
almost every available tool of civil society to bring about this result,
including state- and citywide ballot initiatives, proposed legislation,
litigation, and electoral strategies.97 The only cohesive opposition to
that drive has come from organized labor.98 For example, the Arnold
Foundation has repeatedly financed statewide ballot initiatives in
California that would prospectively convert entities like the California
Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) and the California
State Teachers’ Retirement System (“CalSTRS”) into definedcontribution funds.99 The prime mover in opposing such initiatives has

GALLUP (Aug. 30, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/241679/labor-union-approval-steady-yearhigh.aspx [https://perma.cc/SR43-KUS2] (noting recent strong support for unions).
93. See Barrett & Greene, supra note 85.
94. See id. (“[M]embership may also be sustaining or thriving because people aren’t aware of
the Janus decision or because of actions taken by states to protect unions.”).
95. See id. (quoting Ken Girardin of the conservative Empire Center for Public Policy as
saying, “Based on what we’ve observed, you will likely see a multi-year drop in membership, driven
chiefly by the fact that people aren’t going to join in the first place”).
96. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 213.
97. Id. at 212–35.
98. See U.S. Congress and Retirement Security, LABORERS’ INT’L UNION N. AM.,
http://www.liuna.org/retirement-security (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ED4J-RBP8]
(discussing how the Laborers’ International Union of North America “has been pushing for changes
to the Pension Reform Act that would strengthen pensions and retirement security for working
Americans”).
99. See WEBBER, supra note 25, at 221–23; Allysia Finley, California Pension Fight, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2013, 11:21 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-pension-fight-1381936845
[https://perma.cc/B9HL-2RPH] (noting that Action Now Initiative, an organization associated with
The Arnold Foundation, donated $200,000 in a year to support reforms); Action Now Initiative,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Action_Now_Initiative (last visited Nov. 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/7F9C-PQDM] (reporting that Action Now Initiative “was active in researching
and advocating for public pension reform in California”).
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been the California Teachers Association (“CTA”).100 Not coincidentally,
the CTA was the defendant in a precursor case to Janus, Friedrichs v.
California Teachers Association.101 Prior to Janus, the CTA collected
agency fees.102 Any reduction in those fees, or reduction in unionization
itself, will necessarily reduce the CTA’s resources, potentially reducing
both the resources it can bring to defending defined benefit pensions in
California and the resources it might directly bring to capital strategies.
The CTA is just one example of a national phenomenon. It has
now been forced to remarket itself to its own membership. Other unions
have retained members and dues because of similar efforts to remarket
themselves to their members.103 These costs are defensive in nature and
are diverted from efforts to organize new workers or advance a labor
agenda along other dimensions.104
III. SCHWAB-THOMAS AND THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS OF
LABOR’S CAPITAL
As noted, twenty years ago, Schwab and Thomas brought some
of the first empiricism to the study of labor’s shareholder activism.105
The focus of that paper was primarily private-sector union activism,
although there has always been overlap between public- and privatesector unions.106 For example, the Service Employees International
Union and the International Union of Operating Engineers, both of
which feature in Schwab-Thomas, represent both public- and privatesector workers.107 Still other unions featured in that paper, like the

100. The Truth About Teachers’ Retirement, CAL. TCHRS. ASS’N (May 2017),
https://www.cta.org/en/Issues-and-Action/Retirement.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y8TE-6GFC].
101. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13-676-JLS (CWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
188995, at 3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013).
102. How Teachers Can Opt Out of the California Teachers Association, OPT OUT TODAY,
https://www.optouttoday.com/california-teachers-association (last visited Nov. 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/YHR2-SNP7].
103. Rebecca Rainey & Ian Kullgren, 1 Year After Janus, Unions Are Flush, POLITICO (May
17,
2019),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/17/janus-unions-employment-1447266
[https://perma.cc/AP5W-3HBD] (quoting one union leader as saying, “Janus was seized on by us
and other parts of the labor movement as an opportunity to re-educate and activate our members
in a much bigger fight . . . .”).
104. See
Organizing
In
A
Post-Fair-Share
World,
CAL.
TCHRS.
ASS’N,
https://www.cta.org/leaderresources/Preparing-for-Janus-Decision.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/KP2R-2WTT] (sharing resources for local CTA chapters to promote membership).
105. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 21 (discussing private-sector union activism).
106. Id.
107. About IUOE, INT’L UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS (last visited Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.iuoe.org/about-iuoe [https://perma.cc/TN4N-Q62L]; What Type of Work do SEIU
Members Do?, SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION, https://www.seiu.org/cards/these-fast-facts-will-tell-youhow-were-organized/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2CD2-UAVE] (“SEIU . . . is the
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United Food and Commercial Workers (“UFCW”), represent only
private-sector workers but have often played (then and now) a large role
in public pension funds. For example, one of the most controversial and
effective CalPERS Presidents, Sean Harrigan, was a UFCW leader, and
at least one current board member (Ron Lind) has served as a UFCW
officer.108
The Schwab-Thomas paper enables us to see how the challenges
to labor’s capital have shifted over time. And it helps us to see how
labor’s success in meeting earlier challenges planted the seeds of the
challenges they face today. The main challenge Schwab and Thomas
(accurately) foresaw for labor as shareholder was whether it could
convince other shareholders that it was acting in their interests too visà-vis corporate management.109 They also showed how labor answered
that challenge.110 The Schwab-Thomas paper illustrated the
overwhelming governance focus of labor’s early shareholder activism.111
Documenting the 1996 and 1997 proxy seasons, the paper identified the
types of shareholder proposals filed by unions, proposals that would
sound eerily familiar to ones we observe today.112 They also addressed
what we today view as bread-and-butter governance concerns. Topics
included: linking director pay to performance, repealing classified
boards, redeeming poison pills, requiring directors or director
candidates to attend annual shareholder meetings, capping executive
compensation, voting on future golden parachutes, separating board
chair and CEO, creating a shareholder nominating committee, limiting
relatives on the board, and prohibiting director conflicts of interest.113
A small handful of proposals revealed an arguably more “special
interest” labor focus, resembling topics that have only recently
reappeared on the national and corporate agendas. For example, the
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union proposed that Ashland
largest healthcare union in North America . . . [and] the second largest union of public service
employees . . . .”).
108. Reuters, Calpers Elects Labor Leader as President, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/21/business/calpers-elects-labor-leader-as-president.html
[https://perma.cc/Y5R6-CUHW]; CalPERS’ Board Elects Committee Chairs, Vice Chairs, CALPERS
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/newsroom/calpers-news/2017/board-electschairs-vice-chairs [https://perma.cc/U8AJ-FHEQ].
109. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 21, at 1090 (discussing the need for labor unions to
“adopt a platform of maximizing long-term growth for shareholders and other stakeholders, as well
as themselves”).
110. Id. (“[Unions] are already becoming sophisticated players in corporate-governance
battles.”).
111. Id. (“Labor unions are aggressively using their ownership power to push corporategovernance reforms.”).
112. See id. at 1091–94.
113. Id.
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Company allow an employee on its board.114 The International
Association of Publishers’ Employees proposed that Dow Jones allow a
union member on the board.115 These early proposals are echoed today
in Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposed Accountable Capitalism Act116
and Senator Tammy Baldwin’s proposed Reward Work Act.117 And in
an interesting precursor to today’s reporting of the CEO-to-worker pay
ratio, the Communication Workers of America proposed that Sprint
“[c]ap executive pay [increases] to employee pay increase[s].”118 One
proposal, brought by the Amalgamated Bank of New York Longview
Collective Investment Fund, called for Limited to “[l]ink executive pay
to overseas labor standards.”119
This invaluable work serves to demonstrate that past is prologue
when it comes to labor’s capital. Fringe issues that seemed to attract
little support are today mainstream, widely debated, and to some extent
even widely embraced. Moreover, the core challenge Schwab and
Thomas identified—labor wielding its capital in its own interests while
balancing those of other shareholders—remains as much a challenge
today as it was then.120 Today, because of Janus and the systematic
campaign against defined-benefit pension plans more generally, labor’s
capital faces a new existential threat.121 It is also more powerful than
ever, having created a generation of activists that understand how to
wield shareholder power and have more of it to wield than ever
before.122 It will be interesting to see, twenty years from now, whether
labor’s capital will still be able to meet the challenges it has successfully
coped with over the past two decades.

114. Id. at 1093.
115. Id. at 1091.
116. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable
Capitalism Act (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warrenintroduces-accountable-capitalism-act [https://perma.cc/TA37-AKLR] (“There is an urgent need to
end the grip of shareholder value maximization and return to the era when American corporations
produced broad-based growth that helped workers and shareholders alike.”).
117. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin
Reintroduces Legislation to Rein in Stock Buybacks and Give Workers a Voice on Corporate Boards
(Mar.
27,
2019),
https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/reward-work-act-2019
[https://perma.cc/W8TR-ZJEF] (proposing “legislation to rein in corporate stock buybacks and
empower workers to have a say in how their company’s profits are spent”).
118. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 21, at 1093.
119. See id. at 1093.
120. See id. at 1052.
121. See generally WEBBER, supra note 25 (discussing the coordinated attacks against labor’s
capital by political advocacy groups like Americans for Prosperity and the Arnold Foundation).
122. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s holding in Janus may threaten public
pension fund and labor fund shareholder activism.123 Those threats are
both direct and indirect. If Janus’s reasoning were to apply to
mandatory employee contributions to public pensions, then it could
require the creation of an opt-out right for public employees.124 True,
given how attractive these pensions have been as retirement vehicles,
at least from the perspective of workers and the potentially limited
number of dissenters, such opt outs might be small in number. But even
small numbers of opt outs would reduce the capital that pensions can
bring to bear in the shareholder arena.125 More worrying, opt-out rights
could create more pressure for pensions to move to 401(k)-style
retirement funds, which eliminate shareholder voice.126
The indirect effects of Janus are already making themselves felt.
To date, these effects have been smaller than feared.127 Still, if the longterm effect of Janus is to reduce resources for public-sector unions, that
will in turn reduce resources for the capital strategies divisions of such
unions and reduce the unions’ ability to defend defined-benefit public
pension funds from comprehensive and well-funded efforts to convert
them into 401(k)s.128 In other work, I have argued that collective defined
contribution funds, effectively collective 401(k)s, could preserve some of
the shareholder voice that pensions wield now.129 Still, Janus nudges
the public sector one step closer to the fate that has long since prevailed
in the private sector, namely, the elimination of traditional pensions in
favor of 401(k)s.130
Thus, just over twenty years after Schwab and Thomas first
documented labor’s growing influence as a shareholder, the future of
labor’s capital remains uncertain.131 Labor has passed many of the tests
123. Id. at 239 (“The bigger, more indirect threat to pensions and shareholder activism
stemming from the loss of collective bargaining [after Janus] is that unions will have fewer
resources to invest in shareholder activism, or to defend pensions when they are assaulted in
legislatures or statewide ballot initiatives.”).
124. See Finseth, supra note 27, at 293–94.
125. See Lin, supra note 19.
126. See WEBBER, supra note 25, at 220.
127. See Barrett & Greene, supra note 85 (“The court’s decision also led many to predict that
massive defections of union members would follow. But so far, even as antiunion organizations
wage campaigns to convince members to drop out, most are staying put. Some unions have actually
increased their numbers since the Janus verdict.”).
128. See, e.g., Webber, supra note 63 (describing campaign to undermine pension funds); see
also WEBBER, supra note 25, at 212–58 (discussing “the [f]uture of [l]abor’s [c]apital”).
129. WEBBER, supra note 25, at 213–21.
130. Id. at 220.
131. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 21.
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Schwab and Thomas identified for it decades ago, enhancing its own
effectiveness as a capital steward by earning the trust of other
shareholders.132 Today, the challenges of labor’s capital come not from
other shareholders, but from legal and political threats to its ongoing
existence.133 Labor may successfully navigate those threats. The
outcome of this struggle will have profound effects in the world of
corporate governance and corporate law, given the critical role labor’s
capital funds have played in this arena in the past two decades.134

132. See generally WEBBER, supra note 25.
133. Id.
134. Id.

